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ADMISSIBILITY OF EVIDENCE IN PROBATION/PAROLE
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS AND IN CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS: APPLYING A SINGLE STANDARD
INTRODUCTION
Federal and state courts have uniformly acknowledged that proba-
tioners and parolees1 are entitled to some fourth amendment protec-
tion against unreasonable searches.2  Because of differing views 3 on
1. A probationer is an offender who is "sentenced to remain in the community,
under supervision, in lieu of being incarcerated." A. Smith & L. Berlin, Introduction
to Probation and Parole 3 (2d ed. 1979). A parolee is released from incarceration
before completion of his sentence and placed under supervision in the community.
See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972). "in the U.S. Federal government,
probation and parole are handled by the same agency, and officers handle probation
and parole cases simultaneously." A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra, at 3 n.1. Although
there are minor administrative differences between probation and parole, the fourth
amendment rights of probationers and parolees are indistinguishable. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973); see Van Dyke, Parole Revocation Hearings In
California: The Right to Counsel, 59 Calif. L. Rev. 1215, 1241 (1971) ("technical
differences [between probation and parole] should not receive constitutional impor-
tance").
2. E.g., Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972); United States v. Work-
man, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787,
789 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir.
1975) (en bane); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 248 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1977):
Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1979); Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211,
216, 346 N.E.2d 746, 749 (1976); People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174, 385 N.E.2d
621, 623, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1978); State v. Deener, 64 Ohio St. 2d 335, 337,
414 N.E.2d 1055, 1057 (1980) (per curiam), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1044 (1981). The
fourth amendment states: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath
or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized." U.S. Const. amend. IV. At least one state court has adopted
the view that fourth amendment standards are the same for probationers and parol-
ees as for other citizens. State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa), cert, denied,
398 U.S. 938 (1970). "[W]e believe it fairer and far more realistic that an Iowa State
parolee's Fourth Amendment rights, privileges and immunities, be accorded the
same recognition as any other person. In fact there is to us no apparent constitution-
ally adequate or permissible basis upon which to hold otherwise." Id.
3. Compare, e.g., Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 2,46, 250-51 (9th Cir.) (en bane)
(relationship between parole officer and his parolee is sui generis as to warrant
requirement), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975), and United States v. Rea, 524 F.
Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same regarding probationer), appeal docketed, No.
81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981), with United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90
(4th Cir. 1978) (special relationship serves as grounds for diminished standard of
probable cause required to obtain warrant for parolee), and People v: Jackson, 46
N.Y.2d 171, 175-77, 385 N.E.2d 621, 623-25, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 887-88 (1978) (same
regarding probationer).
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the authority needed by probation/parole officers to effectively super-
vise their charges, however, courts often disagree as to what consti-
tutes an unreasonable search. 4
Many courts consider warrantless searches by probation/parole offi-
cers reasonable if they are based on reasonable cause to believe that a
violation has occurred or is about to occur.5 One court has even
suggested that a probation or parole officer's hunch is sufficient basis
for a warrantless search of his charge." In contrast, some courts,
although granting search warrants to probation/parole officers under
a relaxed standard, maintain that such officers must still obtain a
warrant prior to searching their charges. 7
4. The fourth amendment does not require that to be reasonable a search must
be conducted with a warrant. In United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950),
overruled, Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969), the Court, in dictum,
explored the reasonableness of searches in relation to the warrant clause. '[W]e
cannot agree that [requiring a search warrant] should be crystallized into a sine qua
non to the reasonableness of a search." Id. at 65. Taking all the circumstances into
consideration, a search may be reasonable even if conducted without a warrant. Id.
at 65-66. "The relevant test is not whether it is reasonable to procure a search
warrant, but whether the search was reasonable." Id. at 66. Compare United States
v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en banc) (warrantless
search by probation officer is not a violation of the fourth amendment), and Latta v.
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en banc) (warrantless search of charge by
parole officer did not violate the fourth amendment even though the officer has no
probable cause to believe that a parole violation exists), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897
(1975), with United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1978) (in the
absence of an established exception to the warrant requirement, a search by a
probation officer of his charge requires a warrant), and United States v. Bradley, 571
F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978) (warrant required for search by parole officer). For
a good general discussion of the constitutional rights of parolees, see Note, Rights of
the Convicted Felon on Parole, 13 U. Rich. L. Rev. 367 (1979); Note, Search and
Seizure-Applying the Warrant Requirement to Parolee Searches, 14 Wake Forest L.
Rev. 1207 (1978).
5. Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678, 686-87 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); United States ex
rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Ander-
son, 189 Colo. 34, 37, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) (en banc); State v. Williams, 486
S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Mo. 1972); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94, 590 P.2d 1152, 1155
(1979); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 371 N.E.2d 794, 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d
31, 34 (1977); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 85-88, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094-96
(1973). In State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980), the court upheld a
warrantless search by a probation officer of his charge based on probable cause. Id.
at 368-69. The court refused to decide, however, whether a showing of less than
probable cause would have been sufficient to uphold the warrantless search. Id. at
369 n.5. In Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. 190, 361 A.2d 846 (1976),
although the court stated that a parole officer performing his normal duties is not
required to obtain a warrant, id. at 197, 361 A.2d at 850, it failed to state whether
probable cause was required.
6. Accord Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (parole),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259,
266 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane) (probation).
7. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1978) (proba-
tion); United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978) (parole); People
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The fourth amendment guarantee against unreasonable searches8 is
implemented by the exclusionary rule, which deters such searches by
excluding from criminal proceedings evidence illegally obtained.0
Some courts extend the application of the exclusionary rule to proba-
tion/parole revocation hearings, 10 thus creating a single standard of
admissibility under which evidence obtained in violation of the fourth
amendment is excluded from both criminal trials and revocation pro-
ceedings. Application of the exclusionary rule has been often denied,
however, in revocation proceedings." Courts denying application
v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174-77, 385 N.E.2d 621, 623-25, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886-
88 (1978). In State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980), the Montana Supreme
Court stated that a warrant based on probable cause is required before a probation
officer may conduct a search of his charge's home because such a search infringes on
the privacy of the probationer's family and friends. Id. at 152. A warrantless search
of the probationer's person or automobile, however, if based on reasonable grounds,
is constitutional. Id. at 153.
8. U.S. Const. amend. IV; see supra note 2.
9. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961); Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary
Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 665, 665 (1970).
10. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978); Amiss v.
State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 786-87, 219 S.E.2d 28, 30-31 (1975); State ex rel. Piccarillo
v. Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 397 N.E.2d 354, 356-57, 421 N.Y.S.2d 842, 845
(1979); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); State v.
Stephens, 614 P.2d 1180, 1184 (Or. Ct. App. 1980); see State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d
140, 152 (Mont. 1980); People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 177, 385 N.E.2d 621, 625,
412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (1978); Wilson v. State, 621 S.W.2d 799, 805 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1981); Rushing v. State, 500 S.W.2d 667, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
11. Schneider v. I-ousewright, No. 81-2055, slip op. at 3 & n.4 (8th Cir. Dec. 28,
1981); United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577, 578 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987
(1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(alternate holding); United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir.
1971) (alternate holding); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d
1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 431 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); United States v.
Delago, 397 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States ex rel. Lombardino v.
Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 650-52 (E.D. La. 1970), ajf'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 909-10
(Alaska 1976); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 579-80, 623 P.2d 8, 9-10 (1980) (en
bane); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 78-80, 525 P.2d 461, 462-63 (1974) (en bane);
People v. Dowery, 20 I11. App. 3d 738, 741-44, 312 N.E.2d 682, 684-87 (1974), aff d,
62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 73-75 (La.
1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1094-96 (R.I. 1978); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash.
App. 190, 192-94, 499 P.2d 49, 51-52, aff'd en bane, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061
(1972); see Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Parole Revocation Hearings: Deterring
Official Infringement of Parolees' Fourth Amendment Rights, 1979 B.Y.U. L. Rev.
161; Note, The Exclusionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: A Policy
Appraisal, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 1115 (1976).
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either question the deterrent effect of such exclusion '1 or view revoca-
tion hearings as non-adversarial proceedings to which the exclusionary
rule does not apply.' 3
This Note contends that the latter approach, wherein the fruits of
an illegal search are admitted into revocation proceedings but ex-
cluded from criminal trials, creates a danger that probation/parole
officers will conduct illegal searches, content in the knowledge that
evidence obtained can be used for the limited purpose of revocation.
Under these circumstances, the deterrent effect of excluding the evi-
dence from the criminal trial is questionable. Moreover, the potential
impact of the probation/parole officer's investigatory role is dimin-
ished and the protection of society is compromised by diminution of
the possibility of a new prison term, in addition to whatever prison
term the revocation proceeding might yield, for a criminal offender.
This Note examines the conflicting views toward application of the
fourth amendment to searches by probation and parole officers, and
toward the admissibility in revocation proceedings of evidence ob-
tained in such searches. It argues that a search warrant requirement,
coupled with a lesser standard of probable cause, satisfies the purposes
of probation/parole while affording probationers and parolees some
fourth amendment protection. More significantly, because of the dan-
ger posed by separate standards of admissibility for criminal trials and
revocation proceedings, this Note urges those courts that adhere to the
dual standard to adopt a single standard of admissibility.
I. PROBATION AND PAROLE
Both probation and parole are means by which, as an alternative to
incarceration, a criminal offender is placed under supervision in the
community.' 4 Probation is the suspension of the imposition of sen-
12. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 818 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel.
Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970); State v. Robledo, 116
Ariz. 346, 348, 569 P.2d 288, 290 (1977); Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 219-21,
346 N.E.2d 746, 752 (1976); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 74 (La. 1979). Other
courts specifically question the deterrent effect when the search is conducted by a
policeman unaware of the search victim's probation or parole status. See United
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 912
(Alaska 1976); People v. Dowery, 20 Ili. App. 3d 738, 741, 312 N.E.2d 682, 6S5
(1974), affd, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094,
1095 n.2 (R.I. 1978).
13. United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
856 (1972); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1970); United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd,
318 F. Supp. 648, 652 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971).
14. A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 143; see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 477 (1972).
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tence, or the suspension of the execution of a sentence already im-
posed.' 5 Parole is the conditional release of a convicted criminal after
he has served a portion of his sentence."' Probation or parole status is
generally granted with express conditions directed toward rehabilitat-
ing the probationer or parolee and enabling the probation or parole
officers to control their charges.' 7 Breach of a condition constitutes a
"technical violation"'8 and presents grounds for initiating action to
revoke probation/parole. 19 The decision to initiate revocation pro-
ceedings, however, is within the discretion of the probation and pa-
role agencies. 20  In the exercise of this discretion, technical violations
15. 18 U.S.C. § 3651 (1976); see Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 269-70
(1943); A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 104.
16. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 477 (1972); A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra
note 1, at 107; see 18 U.S.C. § 4205(a) (1976).
17. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 478 (1972); H. Abadinsky, Probation and
Parole: Theory and Practice 185 (1977); H. Burns, Corrections Organization and
Administration 251, 300 (1975); see R. Dawson, Sentencing 306-07 (1969); A. Smith
& L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 144. A statutory provision entitled "Conditions of
parole," 18 U.S.C. § 4209(a) (1976), mandates that in every parole release a condi-
tion be imposed "that the parolee not commit another Federal, State, or local crime."
Id. In addition to the mandatory condition, the Parole Commission may impose any
other reasonable condition to protect the public welfare. Id. A judge granting
probation is given great discretion in imposing conditions. Id. § 3651. The conditions
of parole and probation are very similar. H. Abadinsky, supra, at 184. Some com-
monly imposed probation and parole conditions are that the releasee make restitution
to the aggrieved party of his crime, that he not associate with known criminals and
that he obtain and maintain employment. See H. Abadinsky, supra, at 121-22; A.
Campbell, Law of Sentencing 83-86 (1978); R. Dawson, supra, at 308-09; A. Smith
& L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 143-44. One condition, the validity of which has been
the subject of controversy, is the requirement that the probationer/parolee submit to
warrantless searches at any time of the day or night by any law enforcement officer.
Generally, the courts hold that this condition is too broad and must be narrowed to
be valid. In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
bane), this type of condition was held invalid as an improper infringement of the
probationer's fourth amendment rights. Id. at 265-66; accord People v. Peterson, 62
Mich. App. 258, 265-66, 233 N.W.2d 250, 254-55 (1975); Tamez v. State, 534
S.W.2d 686, 691-92 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). In Peterson and Tainez, the courts
viewed acceptance of the condition as being coerced because the alternative to
acceptance was incarceration. In Consuelo-Gonzalez, the court concluded that if the
condition were narrowed to require the probationer to submit her person and prop-
erty to search by her probation officer in a reasonable manner and at reasonable
times, the condition would have been valid. 521 F. 2d at 265 & n.14. This Note is not
concerned with searches made pursuant to a constitutionally valid search condition,
18. H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 126; A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at
146.
19. See H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 126; A. Campbell, supra note 17, at 82;
R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 307; A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 143.
20. H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 126, 189; see 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976)
(probation); Id. § 4203(b)(3) (parole); C. Newman, Sourcebook on Probation, Parole
and Pardons 76 (3d ed. 1972); A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 146-47.
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are often ignored, and revocation proceedings are usually not initiated
unless it is believed that the probationer or parolee has committed a
new crime. 2' Additionally, in order to effectuate both rehabilitation
and public protection, the probation/parole officer is afforded great
latitude in visiting the home or place of employment of his charge. -
If the circumstances indicate that such action is necessary, officers also
have the authority to investigate and arrest their charges.23
Supervision by the probation/parole officer, therefore, serves a dual
function: protecting society by insuring that the probationer/parolee
abides by the law, and effectuating the rehabilitation of the charge. -24
Which of these two roles predominates depends largely on the attitude
of the individual probation/parole officer25 and may affect the likeli-
hood of an officer conducting an illegal search.
II. PROBATION/PAROLE AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
Warrantless searches of an ordinary citizen are unreasonable per se
under the fourth amendment26 unless they fall within one of a few
narrowly defined exceptions: 27 searches to which the subject volun-
tarily consents; 28 routine administrative searches;29- or searches under
21. H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 126: see R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 145,
315, 358; C. Newman, supra note 20, at 132-33; A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1,
at 146-48.
22. See, e.g., United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978)
(authority of a probation/parole officer to visit the home or place of employment of
his charge may be specifically enumerated as a condition to release); State v. Malone,
403 So. 2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1981) (same); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super.
190, 193, 361 A.2d 846, 847-48 (1976) (same). Some courts view probation/parole
officers' rights to make home visits as inherent to their supervisory role. E.g., United
States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978): Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d
905, 908 (Fla. 1979).
23. H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 284; A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at
146-47.
24. A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at 145-46; see H. Abadinsky, supra note
17, at 282-85; C. Newman, supra note 20, at 205-08.
25. R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 318; A. Smith & L. Berlin, supra note 1, at
202-05; see H. Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 283-86.
26. U.S. Const. amend. IV, construed in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S.
218, 219 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454-55 (1971); Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528-29 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967).
27. United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318 (1972). The
exceptions to the warrant requirement "'are few in number and carefully delineated.'
Id. "The exceptions ... have been jealously and carefully drawn." Jones v. United
States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
28. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). In order for the
consent to be valid, it must be voluntary. Id. at 228-29; see Vale v. Louisiana, 399
U.S. 30, 35 (1970); Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 593-94 (1946). The consent
may be given by someone authorized to act for the search victim. Compare Frazier v.
Cupp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969) (joint user of an article clearly has authority to
1982]
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exigent circumstances that would render obtaining a warrant imprac-
tical.30  Absent one of these exceptions, a reasonable search is one
conducted under a search warrant issued by a "neutral and detached
magistrate" and based on a showing of probable cause.3'
Probationers and parolees, however, historically were virtually de-
nied fourth amendment guarantees32 under the "grace,"3 3 "contract
consent to its search), with Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 489-90 (1964) (consent
given by a hotel clerk to the police to search the room of a guest held invalid because
the guest had not authorized the clerk to permit the search).
29. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th CiT.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 897 (1975). These are searches in which the person or premises to be searched is
subject to extensive government regulation, there is statutory authority for the
search, there is a lesser expectation of privacy, and in which there is a need for
unannounced, frequent searches by government officials. Id. Within this category
are international border searches, Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266,
272-73 (1973), and regulatory inspections of business premises based on statutory
authority. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315-17 (1972) (premises inspection
of firearm dealer); Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 73-76
(1970) (searches made in conjunction with the enforcement of the federal liquor
laws).
30. E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 46-51 (1970) (warrantless search of
a car, which could not be justified as a search incident to an arrest, justifiable
because of mobility of an automobile, provided there is reasonable cause); Chimel v.
California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969) (justification exists for a warrantless search of
an arrestee's person and the area within his immediate control conducted incident to
an arrest); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23 (1968) (stop and frisk for weapons if the
circumstances present sufficient facts to warrant the belief that the suspect is armed
and dangerous); Warden of Maryland Pen. v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298 (1967) (hot
pursuit); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770-71 (1966) (withdrawal of blood
for alcohol level considered an appropriate search incident to arrest because normal
body functions would eliminate evidence before a warrant could be obtained).
31. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449-53 (1971); Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 356-57 (1967); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-15
(1948); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Agnello v. United
States, 269 U.S. 20, 32 (1925). In Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971),
the Court concluded that a warrant issued by the state Attorney General, who was
also the-chief prosecutor in the case, was invalid because the issuer "was not the
neutral and detached magistrate required by the Constitution." Id. at 453. "[T~he
informed and deliberate determinations of magistrates empowered to issue warrants
as to what searches and seizures are permissible under the Constitution are to be
preferred over the hurried action of officers and others who may happen to make
arrests. Security against unlawful searches is more likely to be attained by resort to
search warrants than by reliance upon the caution and sagacity of petty officers
while acting under the excitement that attends the capture of persons accused of
crime." United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932).
32. See generally White, The Fourth Amendment Rights of Parolees and Proba-
tioners, 31 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 167 (1969).
33. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490 (1935). The Court stated that the privilege of
probation does not have its basis in the Constitution. "Probation. . . comes as an act
of grace to one convicted of a crime .. .. '" Id. at 492; accord United States ex rel.
Randazzo v. Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afJ'd, 418 F.2d 1319
(2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971). "[A parolee's] release on parole [is]
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consent" 34 and "constructive custody ' 35 theories. Proponents of the
grace theory viewed probation and parole as conditional privileges
emanating from an act of mercy by a judge or parole board.36 The
contract consent theory is based on a contractual exchange of fourth
amendment rights for conditional freedom.3 7  The premise of the
custody theory is that the probationer or parolee is in legal custody
and thus a quasi-prisoner.38  These theories have now been largely
rejected by courts more sensitive to the rights and needs of probation-
ers and parolees.39
Nevertheless, most courts today still hold that the right of proba-
tioners or parolees to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures
by their supervising officers is subject to lower fourth amendment
standards. 40  The justification for this reduced fourth amendment
an act of grace and favor to him by the Parole Board." Id. at 12; see Note, Parole: A
Critique of Its Legal Foundations and Conditions, 38 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 702, 704-08
(1963) [hereinafter cited as Parole: A Critique].
34. See Parole: A Critique, supra note 33, at 708-11; see, e.g., People v. Mason,
5 Cal. 3d 759, 766, 488 P.2d 630, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302, 306 (1971) (en bane), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972).
35. See Parole: A Critique, supra note 33, at 711-20 (a parolee is still in custody
and, therefore, his rights should be "no different than one who remains in confine-
ment"); see, e.g., People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr.
100, 104 (1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965).
36. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 492 (1935); United States ex rel. Randazzo v.
Follette, 282 F. Supp. 10, 12-13 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), afJ'd, 418 F.2d 1319 (2d Cir.
1969), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 984 (1971); H. Abadinskv, supra note 17, at 130, 201;
see Parole: A Critique, supra note 33, at 704-08.
37. People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 766, 488 P.2d 630, 634, 97 Cal. Rptr. 302,
306 (1971) (en bane), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1016 (1972); see H. Abadinsky, supra
note 17, at 130, 201-02; Parole: A Critique, supra note 33, at 708-11.
38. People v. Hernandez, 229 Cal. App. 2d 143, 149-50, 40 Cal. Rptr. 100, 104
(1964), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 953 (1965); H. Abadinsky,, supra note 17, at 131, 202;
see Parole: A Critique, supra note 33, at 711-20.
39. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481-84 (1972). The Court specifically
rejected the custody theory for diminishing a parolee's constitutional right to due
process. Id. at 483; accord United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir.
1978); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 248-49 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 897 (1975). Morrissey v. Brewer has been construed as rejecting both the
contract consent and custody theories. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d
259, 265 n.15 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). For a discussion of the weaknesses of the
grace, contract consent and custody theories, see Parole: A Critique, supra note 33,
at 704-20. For an excellent analysis of all three theories and the problems attendant
to them, see Comment, The Parole System, 120 U. Pa. L. Rev. 282, 286-300 (1971).
40. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). Latta v.
Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975),
United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No.
81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 36-38, 536 P.2d
302, 304-05 (1975) (en bane); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 907 (Fla. 1979); State
v. Malone, 403 So. 2d 1234, 1239 (La. 1981); State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365, 368
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protection is that broad search powers are required by probation/
parole officers to supervise their charges effectively and to accomplish
the rehabilitative and public protection goals of probation/parole.41
A. Eliminating the Warrant Requirement
Many courts do not require a probation or parole officer to obtain a
warrant prior to conducting a search of his charge. 42  The Ninth
Circuit, in Latta v. Fitzharris,43 reviewed the search of a parolee's
(Minn. 1980); People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174, 385 N.E.2d 621, 623, 412
N.Y.S.2d 884, 886 (1978); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 371 N.E.2d 794,
797, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (1977); State v. Stephens, 614 P.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Or. Ct.
App. 1980) (en banc); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. 190, 195, 361 A.2d
846, 848-49 (1976). Contra State v. Cullison, 173 N.W.2d 533, 537 (Iowa), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 938 (1970).
41. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265-66 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). "Probation
authorities ... have a special and unique interest in invading the privacy of proba-
tioners." Id. at 266; accord Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir.) (en
bane) (dual purpose of public protection and rehabilitation), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
897 (1975); United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1981) (same),
appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); People v. Anderson, 189 Colo.
34, 37, 536 P.2d 302, 304-05 (1975) (en bane) (focused on the public protection
aspect); Grubbs v. State, 373 So. 2d 905, 909 (Fla. L979) (dual purpose); State v.
Malone, 403 So. 2d 12,34, 1239 (La. 1981) (same); State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365,
368 (Minn. 1980) (same); People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174-75, 385 N.E.2d 621,
623-24, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886-87 (1978) (same); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175,
181-82, 371 N.E.2d 794, 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (1977) (same); State v. Stephens,
614 P.2d 1180, 1183-84 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (en bane) (same); Commonwealth v.
Brown, 240 Pa. Super. 190, 195-98, 361 A.2d 846, 849-50 (1976) (same).
42. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 266 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
bane); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250-52 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 897 (1975); United States ex rel. Santos v. Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216,
1218-19 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972); United States ex rel.
Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1158-59 (W.D.N.Y. 1975); People v. Ander-
son, 189 Colo. 34, 38, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) (en bane); State v. Williams, 486
S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Mo. 1972); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 93-94, 590 P.2d 1152,
1154-55 (1979); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 179, 371 N.E.2d 794, 797, 401
N.Y.S.2d 31, 33 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super. 190, 197, 361
A.2d 846, 849-50 (1976); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75, 84-85, 516 P.2d 1088,
1094 (1973).
43. 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). Latta,
on parole from imprisonment pursuant to a California armed robbery conviction,
was arrested at the home of an acquaintance by his parole officer for violating a
condition of his parole. No question was raised as to the validity of the arrest. When
arrested, Latta was holding a pipe containing marijuana. About six hours after the
arrest, Latta's parole officer, accompanied by two local police officers, went to
Latta's home located thirty miles from the place of arrest. Soon after their arrival
they were admitted by Latta's stepdaughter. They identified themselves and in-
formed her of their intention to conduct a search of the premises. Their search
yielded a 41/2 pound brick of marijuana. Id. at 247.
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residence by his parole officer acting without either a warrant or
probable cause. 44 The court held that a parole officer need not obtain
a warrant before searching his parolee or his parolee's home provided
the search is reasonable. 45 On the day it decided Latta, the circuit
court, in United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,4 equated the probation
officer/probationer relationship to the parole officer/parolee relation-
ship 47 and stated that a probation officer, like a parole officer, may
conduct a warrantless search provided it is reasonable in time and
manner.
48
The Ninth Circuit suggested that a probation/parole officer's deci-
sion to search may be reasonable even if it is merely based on a
hunch. 49 Other courts that have eliminated the warrant requirement
for probation/parole officer searches allow the search to be based on a
showing of less than probable cause, but require a more concrete basis
than a hunch.50 All of these courts, however, have had to circumvent
44. Id. at 248-50.
45. Id. at 250.
46. 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane). In Consuelo-Conzalez, the petitioner
was a federal probationer who had signed an open-ended consent to be searched as a
condition of her probation. Id. at 261. The court invalidated the condition as being
too broad and an unconstitutional infringement of the probationer's rights. Id. at
265. The probationer was the victim of an illegal search of her home conducted by
narcotics agents. Id. at 263. The court suppressed the evidence obtained from the
search in a new criminal prosecution largely because the search was conducted by
government agents rather than by her probation officer. Id. at 266.
47. Id. at 265-66.
48. Id. at 266.
49. Id. (probation officer); Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 250 (9th Cir.) (en
bane) (parole officer), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975). The plurality in Latta
articulated its standard of reasonableness: -[A parole officer's] decision [to search]
may be based upon specific facts, though they be less than sufficient to sustain a
finding of probable cause. It may even be based on a 'hunch,' arising from what he
has learned or observed about the behavior and attitude of the parolee." Id. Even if
the basis for the search is reasonable, if the manner of the search is unreasonable the
Ninth Circuit will invalidate the search as violative of the fourth amendment. Id. at
252. Moreover, if the search is nothing more than a subterfuge for a criminal
investigation the search is constitutionally invalid. United States v. Consuelo-Gonza-
lez, 521 F.2d 259, 267 (9th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
50. United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1158 (W.D.N.Y.
1975) (reasonable suspicion); People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 37-38, 536 P.2d 302,
304-05 (1975) (en bane) (rejecting the holding that neither probable nor reasonable
cause is needed, and stating that reasonable grounds are necessary); State v. Wil-
liams, 486 S.W.2d 468, 472-73 (Mo. 1972) (search may be conducted on less than
probable cause); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 94, 590 P.2d 1152, 1155 (1979) (reason-
able grounds); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181, 371 N.E.2d 794, 797, 401
N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (1977) (decision must be rational and reasonable); State v. Simms,
10 Wash. App. 75, 87, 516 P.2d 1088, 1095-96 (1973) (based on well-founded
suspicion). In State v. Earnest, 293 N.W.2d 365 (Minn. 1980), the court upheld a
warrantless search by a probation officer which was based on probable cause. The
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the Supreme Court's position that warrantless searches are unreason-
able per se.5' The Ninth Circuit did so by analogizing probation/
parole officer searches to the administrative searches sanctioned by
the Supreme Court in United States v. Biswell.52 and Colonnade Ca-
tering Corp. v. United States.5 3 Justification was found in the exten-
sive regulation to which parolees are subject, 54 long-standing Califor-
nia case law authorizing such searches, 55 the parolee's reduced
expectation of privacy, 56 and the need for probation/parole officers to
have broad search powers to perform their dual role effectively.Y
Other courts that permit warrantless searches have either relied on
Latta56 or applied similar reasoning. 59
The Ninth Circuit's analogy between probation/parole searches and
administrative searches is faulty. A necessary condition for the admin-
istrative search exception is the presence of express statutory author-
ity.60 The Ninth Circuit relied on California case law in lieu of
express statutory authority.6 This substitution in no way reflects the
court, however, refused to decide whether a showing of less than probable cause
would have been sufficient to uphold the validity of the search. Id. at 369 n.5. In
Diaz v. Ward, 437 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1977), the court, in dictum, stated "that a
parole officer's 'hunch' does not satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements." Id. at 686
(footnote omitted).
51. See supra notes 26-30 and accompanying text.
52. 406 U.S. 311 (1972) (warrantless search of premises of firearms dealers
authorized by federal statute), cited in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th
Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
53. 397 U.S. 72 (1970) (warrantless entry and investigation of retail liquor deal-
ers authorized by statute), cited in Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
54. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 897 (1975).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 265 (9th Cir. 1975) (en
bane); United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 430 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith,
395 F. Supp. 1155, 1159 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
59. United States ex rel. Santos v. Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1218 (2d Cir.
1971); People v. Anderson, 189 Colo. 34, 37-38, 536 P.2d 302, 305 (1975) (en bane);
State v. Williams, 486 S.W.2d 468, 472 (Mo. 1972); Seim v. State, 95 Nev. 89, 93-94,
590 P.2d 1152, 1154-55 (1979); People v. Huntley, 43 N.Y.2d 175, 181-82, 371
N.E.2d 794, 797, 401 N.Y.S.2d 31, 34 (1977); Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa.
Super. 190, 197-98, 361 A.2d 846, 849-50 (1976); State v. Simms, 10 Wash. App. 75,
85-86, 516 P.2d 1088, 1094-95 (1973).
60. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 317 (1972). Inspection searches "may
proceed without a warrant where specifically authorized by statute." Id.; accord
Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76-77 (1970).
61. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 251 (9th Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 897 (1975). Acknowledging that the administrative searches in Biswell and
Colonnade were conducted pursuant to express statutory authority, the Latta court
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concern or policy espoused by the Court in Biswell and Colonnade.
Creation of the exception by the Supreme Court reflected the Court's
deference to congressional authority and its recognition that the need
of Congress to regulate may justify occasional fourth amendment
infringement 2.6 The subsequent Supreme Court decision in Marshall
v. Barlow's, Inc.63 further weakens the Latta court's reliance on
Biswell and Colonnade. The Court, in Marshall, stated that the hold-
ings in Biswell and Colonnade represent "responses to relatively
unique circumstances"6 4 and, emphasizing the importance of preserv-
ing fourth amendment rights, rejected a broad reading of the adminis-
trative search exception.65 After Marshall, there is little doubt that
searches conducted for administrative purposes are within the fourth
amendment and, absent exigent or unique circumstances, require a
warrant.
66
B. Retaining the Warrant Requirement Under a Lesser
Standard of Probable Cause
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit, some courts have refused to elimi-
nate the need for a warrant when a probation or parole officer con-
ducts a search of his charge.6 7  This position was adopted by the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Bradley,"8 which held that "unless
reasoned that even though "no such express statute [exists] here ... there is long
standing judicial authority in California." Id.
62. United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 314-17 (1972); Colonnade Catering
Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970).
63. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
64. Id. at 313. The Court stressed that the fourth amendment applies to adminis-
trative searches. "If the government intrudes on a person's property, the privacy
interest suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of
criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards.- Id. at 312-13.
65. Id. at 311-13.
66. See Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 504-06 (1978). The Court noted that
although the warrant requirement is unaffected, a lesser showing of probable cause
may suffice in certain cases. Id. at 506.
67. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207-08 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978); State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d
140, 151-52 (Mont. 1980); People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 174-77, 385 N.E.2d
621, 623-25, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 886-88 (1978).
68. 571 F.2d 787 (4th Cir. 1978). Bradley was convicted in 1972 and sentenced to
a term of imprisonment. In 1976 he was released on parole. "'The conditions of his
parole included, inter alia, that he obey all federal, state and municipal laws, that he
refrain from possessing any firearm without permission, and that he 'permit [his]
Parole Officer to visit [his] home or place of employment.' " Id. at 788. The court
specifically noted that "[n]ot included in the conditions of parole was consent to
searches conducted during such visits." Id. Bradley's parole officer received a series of
calls from Bradley's landlady stating that Bradley was in possession of a loaded
firearm. Approximately six hours later Murphy went to Bradley's home to investigate
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an established exception to the warrant requirement is applicable, a
parole officer must secure a warrant prior to conducting a search of a
parolee's place of residence even where, as a condition of parole, the
parolee has consented to periodic and unannounced visits by the
parole officer."69 In United States v. Workman,70 the circuit court
extended the warrant requirement to probation officers.
71
In refusing to eliminate the warrant requirement in the probation/
parole setting, the Fourth Circuit asserted that its position was consis-
tent with the Supreme Court's view that exceptions to the warrant
requirement " 'are few in number and carefully delineated.' "172 The
Workman and Bradley courts rejected the analogy to administrative
searches espoused by the Ninth Circuit. 73 This rejection was based on
the absence of a statute enabling probation and parole officers to
make warrantless searches. 74 Rather, the Supreme Court decision in
Camara v. Municipal Court,75 "requiring as it does prior judicial
the alleged violations. She conducted a warrantless search without Bradley's consent
and uncovered a loaded firearm wrapped in a shirt inside a suitcase. The parole
officer delivered the weapon to federal investigators who determined that it had been
transported in interstate commerce before coming into Bradley's possession. Id. In
addition to having his parole revoked, Bradley was tried and convicted for violating
the federal firearms laws. On appeal, Bradley contended that the warrantless search
was in violation of his fourth amendment rights, and that the evidence thus seized
should be excluded from the subsequent criminal prosecution. Even though the
search was based on probable cause, id. at 788 n.1, the court held the fruits of the
warrantless search inadmissible in the subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. at 790.
69. Id. at 789 (footnote omitted).
70. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978). Workman, while on five years probation for a
conviction of possession of a distillery and bootleg whiskey, id.at 1206, was charged
with violating the conditions of his probation. Two of the conditions were that he
"not possess, manufacture, sell, or buy any illegal whiskey and that he not violate any
law of the United States or North Carolina." Id. During his probationary period, his
probation officer, accompanied by an alcoholic beverage control agent, conducted a
warrantless search of Workman's property. This search uncovered an illegal still.
Based on this evidence, the probation officer filed a complaint against Workman. Id.
at 1206-07.
71. Id.at 1207. "Relying primarily" on Bradley, the Workman court concluded
that a probation officer could not conduct a warrantless search of his probationer's
premises merely because he has probable cause. Id.
72. Id. (quoting United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 318
(1972)); see supra notes 26-31 and accompanying text.
73. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789 (4th Cir. 1978). The court stated
that Biswell and Colonnade "represent narrow exceptions to the general rule ...
that warrants are required prior to conducting administrative searches." Id. (empha-
sis in original).
74. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978). "[The]
absence of legislative authority distinguishes probation officers from inspectors who
are empowered by statute to conduct searches of certain regulated businesses without
warrants." Id.
75. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
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approval to unconsented [administrative] searches even in the face of
reduced privacy interest, is the more persuasive authority. "
7
Acknowledging the special relationship that comprises probation/
parole and which serves as a justification for eliminating the warrant
requirement in the Ninth Circuit,77 the court determined that the dual
goals of probation and parole would be adequately served by relaxing
the showing of probable cause necessary for a probation/parole officer
to obtain a warrant. 7  The court, however, did not articulate its
standard of diminished probable cause. One suggested standard
would involve consideration of the strength of the showing of cause,79
76. United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 789-90 (4th Cir. 1978).
77. 585 F.2d at 1207; accord United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th
Cir. 1978).
78. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1207 (4th Cir. 1978); United
States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978). The concept of variable
probable cause in administrative searches has been utilized by the Supreme Court. In
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Court stated that a search
warrant issued in a criminal investigation must be based on a showing of probable
cause that the goods will be uncovered in the place sought to be searched. Id. at 535.
On the other hand, if the search is for the purpose of insuring compliance with health
and safety codes, probable cause to issue a warrant "may be based upon the passage
of time, the nature of the building [to be searched] . . . or the condition of the entire
area, but [probable cause] will not necessarily depend upon specific knowledge of the
condition of the particular dwelling." Id. at 538; accord Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S.
499, 505-09 (1978) (search warrant to determine origin of fire may be issued on less of
a showing of probable cause than in criminal searches); Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc.,
436 U.S. 307, 320 (1978) (probable cause in a criminal sense is not required for
federal safety inspections). In New York, the authority of a probation officer to
search his charge is governed by statute. Section 410.50(3) of the New York Criminal
Procedure Law allows a court to issue a search warrant to a probation officer on a
showing that tlere is reasonable cause to believe that there has been a probation
violation. N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 410.50(3) (McKinney 1971). Section 410.50(4)
provides for a limited search of a probationer's person when the probation officer
makes an arrest. Id. § 410.50(4). Based on this statute and the fourth amendment
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, the New York Court of
Appeals, in People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 385 N.E.2d 621, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884
(1978), held that a probation officer must obtain a search warrant based on reason-
able cause prior to conducting a search of his charge. Id. at 175-77, 385 N.E.2d at
623-25, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 887-88. In Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246 (9th Cir.) (en
bane), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975), the Ninth Circuit addressed the possibility
of requiring a diminished standard of probable cause as an alternative to eliminating
the warrant requirement altogether. Id. at 251. The court reasoned that having a
magistrate issue a warrant on the basis of a parole officer's hunch, however, would
reduce the warrant to a "paper tiger." Id. at 251-52. Judge Hufstedler, in her
dissenting opinion in Latta, strenuously opposed the plurality's decision to eliminate
the warrant requirement. Id. at 254 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting). She argued that the
"concept of probable cause is not rigid. It is flexible enough to be adapted to parole
searches to give the parolee meaningful protection and to preserve the functions of
parole." Id.
79. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
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the nature of the suspected probation/parole violations,8 ° the possible
invasion of privacy of persons other than the probationer/parolee 8
and the possibility of alternative means of probation/parole supervi-
sion. 82 Any such standard, although necessarily subjective, permits a
neutral and detached magistrate to strike a pragmatic balance be-
tween the rigors of traditional probable cause83 and the potential
excesses of a warrantless search.
Any restriction placed on probation or parole officers by a warrant
requirement will not be overly detrimental to either the public protec-
tion or rehabilitation goal of probation/parole.8 4 These goals are well
served by the officer's broad authority to visit his charge.85 While
visiting, the officer may conduct a warrantless search if circumstances
so require.86
III. THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE IN PROBATION/PAROLE
REVOCATION PROCEEDINGS
The exclusionary rule-the primary mechanism employed by the
courts to enforce the fourth amendment prohibition against unreason-
able search and seizure 8 7 -was first applied by the Supreme Court to
80. Id.
81. Id. In State v. Fogarty, 610 P.2d 140 (Mont. 1980), the Montana Supreme
Court, concerned with the possible violation of privacy of a probationer's family and
friends, applied the traditional standard of probable cause to a probation officer
seeking to obtain a search warrant for a probationer's home. Id. at 152. The holding,
however, is specifically limited to searches of a probationer's residence, id, at 153,
and does not include a search by a probation officer of a probationer's person or his
automobile, which are subject to warrantless searches. Id.
82. Latta v. Fitzharris, 521 F.2d 246, 257 (9th Cir.) (en bane) (Hufstedler, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 897 (1975).
83. See United States v. Bradley, 571 F.2d 787, 790 (4th Cir. 1978).
84. United States N. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978).
85. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1971). A visit is not a search, id.,
and therefore does not present the constitutional issues attendant to searches. The
federal probation law, 18 U.S.C. § 3655 (1976), provides that a probation officer
"shall ise all suitable methods, not inconsistent with the conditions imposed by the
court, to aid probationers and to bring about improvements in their conduct and
condition." Id. This statute inherently gives probation officers the right to make
home visits. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1208 (4th Cir. 1978); cf. R.
Dawson, supra note 17, at 131, 326 (home visits under Michigan parole laws).
86. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464-73 (1971). Any evidence
of violation in plain view may be seized by the probation or parole officer. Id. For his
own safety, the probation or parole officer can frisk his charge without consent. See
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 23-27 (1968). He may also conduct a search pursuant to
consent. See Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 222 (1973). Moreover, "any
time within the probation period, the probation officer may for cause arrest the
probationer wherever found, without a warrant." 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976). There-
fore, if during a visit a probation officer has cause to arrest his client, he may make a
search incident to the arrest. See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
87. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 654-56 (1961).
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federal peace officers in Weeks v. United States.8  In Mapp v.
Ohio,89 the rule was applied to state officers and made binding on the
states.90
The primary purpose of the application of the exclusionary rule is to
deter law enforcement officers from engaging in searches violative of
the fourth amendment.9' In United States v. Calandra,2 the Su-
preme Court stated that "the rule is a judicially created remedy
designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights generally through its
deterrent effect, rather than a personal constitutional right of the
party aggrieved .... [It] has never been interpreted to proscribe the
use of illegally seized evidence in all proceedings or against all per-
sons."' 93  In determining whether the rule should be applied, the
Court requires a weighing of the potential harm of excluding relevant
evidence against the potential benefit of deterring illegal searches."'
88. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). In establishing the rule, the Weeks Court based the need
for an exclusionary rule in the federal courts upon the prohibition of unreasonable
searches and seizures in the fourth amendment. The Court stated that -[i]f letters
and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a
citizen accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his
right to be secure against such searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those
thus placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution." Id. at
393. In Weeks, however, the exclusionary rule was expressly limited to federal cases
in which federal officers had obtained the evidence illegally. Id. at 398. Therefore,
the states were left free to decide whether or not to follow the federal exclusionary
rule. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), overrulcd, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), the Court held that a conviction by a state for a state offense does not
deny the due process of law required by the fourteenth amendment solely because
evidence that was admitted was obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure. Id.
at 33.
89. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
90. Id. at 655-60. The Supreme Court held that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment fully incorporated the fourth amendment, and therefore, the
exclusionary rule requires the exclusion of all evidence obtained by searches violative
of the fourth amendment from all state, as well as federal, criminal proceedings. Id.
91. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976): United States v. Calandra,
414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); see Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216-17 (1960).
Another justification for the application of the exclusionary rule has been that it
maintains judicial integrity, id. at 222-23, in that courts admitting illegally obtained
evidence would "be accomplices in the willful disobedience of a Constitution they are
sworn to uphold." Id. at 223. Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, have
rejected the "imperative of judicial integrity." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485
(1976). "While courts, of course, must ever be concerned with preserving the integ-
rity of the judicial process, this concern has limited force as a justification for the
exclusion of highly probative evidence." Id. (footnote omitted).
92. 414 U.S. 338 (1974) (refusing to extend application of the exclusionary rule to
grand jury proceedings).
93. Id. at 348 (footnote omitted).
94. See, e.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458-60 (1976) (refusing to
extend the exclusionary rule to civil proceedings because such extension would not
provide any significant deterrent effect); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
351 (1974) (deterrent effect to be derived from application of the exclusionary rule to
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Regardless of the standard employed, once a court decides that a
probationer or parolee has been the victim of an unreasonable search
by his supervising officer, it must then determine the admissibility of
the evidence obtained. Although the exclusionary rule will prohibit
admission of the evidence in a subsequent criminal trial,05 the applica-
bility of the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings is unsettled.m1
A. Applying the Rule
Some courts refuse to admit evidence illegally obtained by proba-
tion/parole officers into revocation proceedings.0 7 In United States v.
Workman,9 the Fourth Circuit extended the exclusionary rule to
revocation hearings, 99 utilizing the balancing test prescribed in United
States v. Calandra.100 The test, as applied by the Fourth Circuit,
weighed the potential deterrent benefit of extending the rule against
grand jury proceedings would be "uncertain at best"). In Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165 (1969), the Court, determining whether evidence illegally obtained
from a person other than the defendant should be excluded from a criminal trial,
refused to extend the exclusionary rule. The Court reasoned that the additional
benefits of extending the rule to defendants whose rights were not violated by the
search would not justify "further encroachment upon the public interest." Id. at 175.
95. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
96. Compare United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978)
(rule applied), and State v. Stephens, 614 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (en
bane) (same), with United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1981)
(rule not applied), appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981), and State
v. Robledo, 116 Ariz. 346, 347-48, 569 P.2d 288, 289-90 (1977) (same). For a general
discussion of the constitutional questions involved in this application of the exclusion-
ary rule, see The Exclusionary Rule in Parole Revocation Hearings: Deterring Offi-
cial Infringement of Parolees' Fourth Amendment Rights, supra note 11; The Exclu-
sionary Rule in Probation and Parole Revocation: A Policy Appraisal, supra note 11.
97. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210 (4th Cir. 1978); State v.
Stephens, 614 P.2d 1180, 1181 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (en bane); see State v. Fogarty,
610 P.2d 140, 154 (Mont. 1980) (lower court's decision to revoke probation based on
evidence obtained by illegal search by probation officer vacated); People v. Jackson,
46 N.Y.2d 171, 177, 385 N.E.2d 621, 624-25, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884, 888 (1978) (evidence
obtained by unreasonable search could not be used as a basis for probation revoca-
tion). In Rushing v. State, 500 S.W.2d 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), two policemen,
aware of the defendant's probationary status, conducted a warrantless search. Id. at
670-71. The court held the search illegal and ordered the evidence excluded from
defendant's revocation hearing. Id. at 673.
98. 585 F.2d 1205 (4th Cir. 1978).
99. Id. at 1210-11.
100. Id. at 1209 (citing United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974)). The
Court in Calandra balanced the potential injury to the role and functions of a grandjury against the potential benefits of applying the exclusionary rule. 414 U.S. at 349-
52. In deciding against extending the rule to grand jury proceedings, the Court
concluded that the deterrent effect would be minimal because the grand jury pro-
ceeding was not finally adjudicative of the issue of guilt or innocence. Id.
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the potential injury to the process of revocation.101 The court con-
cluded that because a revocation proceeding may result in the loss of
liberty, 02 "the application of the exclusionary rule will result in ap-
proximately the same potential for injury and benefit" 0 3 as would its
application in a criminal trial. 104
This application of the exclusionary rule creates a single standard of
admissibility of evidence in revocation proceedings and new criminal
trials.0 5 Those probation/parole officers who emphasize their law
101. 585 F.2d at 1209. Other courts that have used a Calandra-type balancing test
have concluded that the harm to the probation/parole system caused by excluding
relevant evidence outweighs any benefit that might be realized by extension of the
exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 913-14
(Alaska 1976); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 580, 623 P.2d 8, 10 (19S0) (en bane);
State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 73-74 (La. 1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095-
96 (R.I. 1978); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 195, 499 P.2d 49, 52, affd en bai,
81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972).
102. 585 F.2d at 1209. A revocation proceeding is adjudicative. The hearing will
determine if the probationer/parolee is guilty of a violation and, ultimately, whether
he retains his liberty interest. Id. Upon a determination of parole violation, parole
may be revoked. 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d)(5) (1976). Upon revocation of probation, -the
court may... require [the probationer] to serve the sentence imposed. . . and, if
imposition of sentence was suspended, may impose any sentence which might origi-
nally have been imposed." Id. § 3653. In People ex rel. Piccarillo v. Board of Parole,
48 N.Y.2d 76, 397 N.E.2d 354, 421 N.Y.S.2d 842 (1979), the court refused to admit
evidence illegally obtained by a police officer into a parole revocation hearing. Id. at
81, 397 N.E.2d at 357, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 845. The court viewed revocation hearings as
a type of administrative proceeding and stated that the applicability of the exclusion-
ary rule to administrative hearings is indisputable. Id. Additionally, the court
stressed the potential deprivation of liberty attendant to revocation proceedings. Id.
at 80-81, 397 N.E.2d at 356, 421 N.Y.S.2d at 845.
103. 585 F.2d at 1210; cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S.
693 (1965) (forfeiture proceeding). In Plymouth Sedan, two Pennsylvania liquor
control officers, without a warrant, stopped and searched an automobile finding
thirty-one cases of liquor not bearing Pennsylvania tax seals. Id. at 694. Pursuant to a
state statute, the automobile, as a vehicle used in the illegal transportation of liquor,
was the subject of a forfeiture proceeding initiated by the Commonwealth. Id. The
court held that because the evidence, the liquor, was obtained by a search conducted
in violation of the fourth amendment, it could not be relied upon to sustain a
forfeiture of the automobile. Id. at 696-98. The Court reasoned that a forfeiture
proceeding of this type is quasi-criminal in character because "[its object, like a
criminal proceeding, is to penalize for the commission of an offense against the law."
Id. at 700. The Court further noted that, in this case, allowing the state to retain the
automobile would result in a greater monetary fine than the maximum fine imposed
by statute in a criminal proceeding. Id. at 700-01.
104. 585 F.2d at 1210.
105. It is still possible for a dual standard of admissibility to exist, however, even
when the exclusionary rule is applied to revocation proceedings. In Crubbs v. State,
373 So. 2d 905 (Fla. 1979), the Supreme Court of Florida construed the Florida
constitution as requiring the application of the exclusionary rule in revocation pro-
ceedings as well as in new criminal prosecutions. Id. at 909. Nonetheless, the court
created a dual standard of admissibility by holding that a warrantless search by a
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enforcement function 106 are thereby deterred from using their position
to conduct illegal searches for the limited purpose of obtaining evi-
dence admissible only in revocation proceedings. 10 7 Moreover, pro-
ducing evidence admissible at a criminal trial through satisfaction of
the single standard maximizes the public protection aspect of proba-
tion/parole supervision 1 08 by increasing the likelihood of imposition of
a new sentence for the crime constituting the probation/parole viola-
tion.
The issue of admissibility of evidence obtained against probationers
and parolees has also arisen in the context of unreasonable searches
conducted by police officers who were unaware of the victim's proba-
tion or parole status.10  Without knowledge of this status, the police
officers could not possibly have planned an unreasonable search for
the limited purpose of revocation. Extending the exclusionary rule
under these circumstances, therefore, has a questionable deterrent
effect." 0 Thus, some courts have correctly refused to apply the exclu-
probation officer "is valid to the extent that the evidence discovered is used only In
probation violation proceedings." Id. at 907. Thus, the dual standard of admissibility
is created not by an express inconsistent application of the exclusionary rule, but by
the inconsistent application of the warrant requirement to create a dual standard of
reasonableness of a search. Id.; accord Commonwealth v. Brown, 240 Pa. Super.
190, 197, 361 A.2d 846, 850 (1976) (no warrant is required if parole officer Is
collecting evidence to revoke charge's parole). Its effect, however, is the same as that
achieved by differing applications of the exclusionary rule and is therefore subject to
the same criticisms.
106. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text,
107. United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 1205, 1210-11 (4th Cir. 1978).
108. See supra notes 14-25 and accompanying text. If, in addition to revocation, a
probationer/parolee is convicted of a new criminal offense, consecutive sentences
may be imposed to punish both the original conviction and the subsequent offense.
United States v. Lustig, 555 F.2d 751, 753 (9th Cir. 1977) (per curiam), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 1045 (1978). Imposing a consecutive sentence will considerably postpone a
parolee's eligibility for reparole. R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 365. Another advan-
tage of securing a conviction in addition to revocation is that the conviction will be
reflected on the probationer/parolee's record and possibly have adverse effects upon
him in later contacts with criminal justice agencies. Even if the sentence for the new
criminal conviction is imposed concurrently, the new minimum sentence may be
longer than the time left on his original sentence. Id.
109. United States v. Vandemark, 522 F.2d 1019, 1020 (9th Cir. 1975); United
States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 52 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 908
(Alaska 1976); Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 784-85, 219 S.E.2d 28, 29 (1975);
People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 741, 312 N.E.2d 682, 685 (1974), aJJ'd, 62 Ill.
2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 70 (La. 1979); People
ex rel. Piccarillo v. Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 81, 397 N.E.2d 354, 357, 421
N.Y.S.2d 842, 845 (1979); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1401 (Okla. Grim. App.
1973); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1094 (R.I. 1978). For purposes of this discus-
sion, police officers include all peace officers such as Border Patrol Agents, agents of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and other similar law enforcement agents.
110. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears, 553
P.2d 907, 912 (Alaska 1976); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 741, 312 N.E.2d
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sionary rule in these instances.'' Many of these courts, however,
have stated that if an illegal search were conducted by a probation/
parole officer, or a policeman aware of the search victim's probation/
parole status, the result might be different."12
Nonetheless, other courts, when confronted with unreasonable
searches conducted by police officers unaware of their subjects' proba-
tion/parole status, have extended the exclusionary rule to revocation
proceedings."13 The rationale has been that such searches present no
less an invasion of an individual's constitutional rights."' Such rea-
soning, however, ignores that the exclusionary rule is not a personal
constitutional right, l" 5 but rather a judicial deterrent to constitutional
violations. 11 6 Where, as here, the deterrent effect is questionable at
best, application of the rule is unwarranted." 7
B. Refusing to Apply the Rule
Several courts, relying on various rationales, have held that the
exclusionary rule does not apply to revocation proceedings." 8 Some
682, 685 (1974), aff'd, 62 Il. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis, 375 So.
2d 69, 74 (La. 1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (R.I. 1978).
111. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears, 553
P.2d 907, 913 (Alaska 1976); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 744-45, 312
N.E.2d 682, 687 (1974), aff'd, 62 I1. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis,
375 So. 2d 69, 75 (La. 1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1096 (R.I. 1978).
112. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975); State v. Sears,
553 P.2d 907, 914 (Alaska 1976); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 74 (La. 1979); State
v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095 n.2 (R.I. 1978).
113. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 786-87, 219 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1975); Michaud
v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okla. Crim. App. 1973); Wilson v. State, 621
S.W.2d 799, 803-05 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); see People ex rel. Piccarillo v. Board of
Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 81-83, 397 N.E.2d 351, 357-58, 421 N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (1979).
The same result was obtained in Ray v. State, 387 So. 2d 995, 997 (Fla. App. 1980),
based on an express exclusionary rule in the Florida State Constitution.
114. Amiss v. State, 135 Ga. App. 784, 786, 219 S.E.2d 28, 30 (1975), People ex
rel. Piccarillo v. Board of Parole, 48 N.Y.2d 76, 82-83, 397 N.E.2d 354, 357, 421
N.Y.S.2d 842, 846 (1979); Michaud v. State, 505 P.2d 1399, 1402-03 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1973).
115. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974).
116. Id.; see supra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
117. Unlike police officers who are unaware of the search victim's status, proba-
tion and parole officers would logically be deterred from conducting unreasonable
searches by extension of the exclusionary rule to revocation hearings. Therefore, it
can be inferred that courts applying the rule to searches by police unaware of the
probationer/parolee's status would similarly invoke the exclusionary rule to unrea-
sonable searches conducted by probation and parole officers, because by doing so
they would simultaneously vindicate the privacy rights of the individual and achieve
the primary goal of the exclusionary rule-deterrence.
118. Schneider v. Housewright, No. 81-2055, slip op. at 3 n.4 (8th Cir. Dec. 28,
1981); United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Frederickson, 581 F.2d 711, 713-14 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
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courts reason that exclusion of evidence in criminal prosecutions is
sufficient to deter illegal law enforcement behavior." 9 It has also
been suggested that revocation hearings are non-adversarial proceed-
ings to which the exclusionary rule does not apply.120 Another enun-
ciated rationale is that exclusion of evidence from revocation hearings
would be detrimental to the efficient operation of the probation/
parole system.' 21 Evidence obtained from an illegal search, there-
fore, would be admissible in probation/parole revocation proceedings,
although inadmissible in a new criminal prosecution.12 2  In United
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick,123 evidence from an illegal search
conducted by two policemen was used to revoke Sperling's parole 24
after an indictment based on this evidence had been dismissed because
United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162-63 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987
(1975); United States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94, 95 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam)
(alternate holding); United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 856 (1972); United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir.
1971) (alternate holding); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d
1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Rea, 521 F. Supp. 427, 431 (E.D.N.Y.
1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); United States v.
Delago, 397 F. Supp. 708, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States ex rel. Lombardino v.
Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 6418, 650-52 (E.D. La. 1970), ajf'd per curiain, 438 F.2d 1027
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907, 910
(Alaska 1976); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 579-80, 623 P.2d 8, 9-10 (1980) (en
bane); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 79-80, 525 P.2d 461, 463 (1974) (en bane),
People v. Dowery, 20 111. App. 3d 738, 741-44, 312 N.E.2d 682, 685-87 (1974), aJJW',
62 I1l. 2d 200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 73-75 (La.
1979); State v. Spratt, 386 A.2d 1094, 1095-96 (R.I. 1978); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash.
App. 190, 193-95, 499 P.2d 49, 51-52, aff'd en banc, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061
(1972).
119. E.g., United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 818-19 (7th Cir. 1971); United
States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970).
120. United States v. Johnson, 455 F.2d 932, 933 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
856 (1972); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1970); United States v. Rea, 524 F. Supp. 427, 431 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal dock-
eted, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd,
318 F. Supp. 648, 652 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971). But cf. One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania,
380 U.S. 693 (1965) (exclusionary rule applied to criminal forfeiture proceeding).
121. United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2d Cir.
1970).
122. See United States v. Lacey, 648 F.2d 441, 443 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981), petition
for cert. filed, 50 U.S.L.W. 3772 (U.S. Jan. 26, 1982) (No. 81-1501); United States .'cx
rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1164 (2d Cir. 1970); United States cx rel.
Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 650-52 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd per curtain,
438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971); People v. Dowery, 20 111.
App. 3d 738, 739, 744, 312 N.E.2d 682, 683, 687 (1974), afj'd, 62 Ill. 2d 200, 340
N.E.2d 529 (1975); State v. Davis, 375 So. 2d 69, 75 (La. 1979); State v. Caron, 334
A.2d 495, 498 (Me. 1975).
123. 426 F.2d 1161 (2d Cir. 1970).
124. Id. at 1162-63.
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of the illegal search. 2 5  Holding that the exclusionary rule is not
applicable to parole revocation proceedings, the Second Circuit stated
that "[t]here is no need for double application of the exclusionary rule,
using it first as it was used here in preventing criminal prosecution of
the parolee and a second time at a parole revocation hearing." 2-
In United States v. Rea,127 this dual standard was extended to a
search conducted by four probation officers of a probationer's resi-
dence. Citing Sperling,128 the court determined that because "the
exclusionary rule is not applicable in a proceeding to revoke parole or
probation," it did not have to decide whether the search was constitu-
tionally reasonable.12 9 In support of its position, the court stated that
"if Rea is correct in his contention that a warrant was required, he
will be protected in any criminal prosecution that may be brought
against him based on the items found in his apartment." 30 Because
the evidence was admitted in the revocation hearing, however, the
probation officers succeeded in incarcerating Rea' and were thereby
encouraged to conduct future such illegal searches.
The deterrent effect of excluding evidence from criminal trials
under these circumstances, therefore, is illusory. Moreover, whatever
the benefit of removing a criminal from society by revoking probation
or parole, society is not afforded the full protection of its laws because
of the increased likelihood that probation/parole officers will conduct
substandard searches and the consequent loss of the use of evidence in
a criminal prosecution. This loss seriously impairs the ability of society
to commit a criminal offender to a term of imprisonment in addition
to whatever term the revocation might yield. 3"2
125. Id. at 1162 n.2.
126. Id. at 1164. In United States v. Delago, 397 F. Supp. 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1974),
the defendant sought to exclude from his probation revocation hearing certain admis-
sions he had made to his probation officer. His contention was that the exclusionary
rule prohibits the use of evidence obtained in violation of the Miranda rule. The
court, relying on Sperling, id. at 712, refused to extend the exclusionary rule to the
probation revocation. Id.
127. 524 F. Supp. 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir.
Oct. 30, 1981).
128. Id. at 431 (citing United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161
(2d Cir. 1970)).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 432.
132. United States ex rel. Coleman v. Smith, 395 F. Supp. 1155, 1160 (W.D.N.Y.
1975) ("In the absence of regulations, however, the day may come when the fruits of
searches of parolees will be admissible in parole revocation proceedings only."). In
Coleman, a parole officer's search was held illegal under the fourth amendment
because the parole officer possessed no "reasonable suspicion" of the petitioner's
unlawful activity. Id. at 1158. Therefore, the court held the search illegal and the
fruits inadmissible in a subsequent criminal prosecution. Id. Even though a search is
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The danger that probation and parole officers will conduct illegal
searches for the limited purpose of revocation 133 is exacerbated by the
fact that probation and parole officers may undertake searches at the
urging of the police.134 To police, an independent prosecution and a
probation or parole revocation are often equivalent: 13 5 Both serve to
remove a criminal offender from the community. Indeed, the proce-
dural ease of revocation may make it preferable to police. 10 The
advantages of revocation for police, and the substantial advantages
accruing to probation and parole officers who develop an informal
working relationship with law enforcement agencies, 137 create a dan-
considered unreasonable, as was the search in Coleman, and its fruits inadmissible in
a subsequent criminal prosecution, the law is clear in the Second Circuit that the
evidence may be used as grounds for revocation. See United States v. Rea, 524 F.
Supp. 427 (E.D.N.Y. 1981), appeal docketed, No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. Oct. 30, 1981).
133. See R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 364. The danger is enhanced because
parole authorities would rather see evidence used in a revocation proceeding than In
a criminal prosecution. "If the parolee is prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced, he is
continually exposed to newspaper publicity which . .may result in the formation of
public opinion adverse to the parole system. Parole agencies are particularly sensitive
to newspaper criticism and may view revocation as a satisfactory means of avoiding it
.... Id. (footnote omitted).
134. See, e.g., United States v. Gordon, 540 F.2d 452, 453 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States ex rel. Santos v. New York State Board of Parole, 441 F.2d 1216, 1217 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1025 (1972). Frequently, law enforcement officers will
inform the probation or parole officer that his charge is involved in illegal conduct,
and will then accompany the probation/parole officer conducting a warrantless
search. See id. In Gordon, narcotics agents informed the probation officer that his
client might be dealing in controlled substances. 540 F.2d at 453. The probation
officer requested that the narcotics agents assist in performing a search of the proba-
tioner's home. The actual search was conducted by the narcotics agents. Id. In
Santos, a police detective informed the parole officer that he had received informa-
tion that the parolee was dealing in stolen goods. The detective and the parole officer
went to the parolee's house and, not finding the parolee home, conducted a warrant-
less search seizing evidence of criminal activity. 441 F.2d at 1217. The police serve as
a principal source of information for probation officers. R. Dawson, supra note 17, at
145. In People v. Jackson, 46 N.Y.2d 171, 385 N.E.2d 621, 412 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1978),
a police officer informed Jackson's probation officer that Jackson was dealing in
drugs. The police officer then accompanied two probation officers in making a
search. Id. at 173, 385 N.E.2d at 622, 412 N.Y.S.2d at 885-86. The likelihood of
police surveillance of a parolee is increased because parole agencies often notify the
police of a parolee's status. R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 319.
135. United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817, 820 & n.4 (7th Cir. 1971) (Fairchild, J.,
dissenting).
136. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972) ("[Revocation] is often pre-
ferred to a new prosecution because of the procedural ease of recommitting the
individual on the basis of a lesser showing by the State." (footnote omitted)); see R.
Dawson, supra note 17, at 363-64.
137. R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 365 n.72. "The parole agency's cooperation in
revoking upon request [of police and prosecutors] may have considerable value in
promoting cooperation from the enforcement agencies in areas in which the parole
agency needs it." Id.
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gerous possibility that the probation or parole officer will comply with
a request from a law enforcement officer to conduct a substandard
search for revocation purposes. 138 This unacceptable practice can be
avoided by adoption of a single standard of admissibility.
A similar problem may arise when an illegal search is conducted by
a police officer. A number of courts that have explicitly held that the
exclusionary rule is inapplicable to revocation proceedings have
reached this conclusion only in the context of such searches. 3 9  A
138. In addition to the advantage to parole agencies of the lesser publicity atten-
dant to revocation, seeking revocation instead of prosecuting for a new offense puts
the parole agency in a posture of cooperation with enforcement agencies. R. Daw-
son, supra note 17, at 364. "In many cases, the benefits of the revocation alternative
are greater for the enforcement agencies than for the parole system. Nevertheless, the
parole agency invariably complies with requests from these agencies to revoke the
parole of a clearly convictable parolee. While the direct benefits of revocation in such
cases may be minimal to the parole agency, its action aids efforts to secure the
cooperation of police and prosecutor in their contacts with parolees." Id. at 364-65
(footnotes omitted).
139. See United States v. Wiygul, 578 F.2d 577 (5th Cir. 1978) (per curiam);
United States v. Fredrickson, 581 F.2d 711 (8th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); United
States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975); United
States v. Brown, 488 F.2d 94 (5th Cir. 1973) (per curiam); United States v. Hill, 447
F.2d 817 (7th Cir. 1971); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161
(2d Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880
(1971); State v. Sears, 553 P.2d 907 (Alaska 1976); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 623
P.2d 8 (1980) (en banc); People v. Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 525 P.2d 461 (1974) (en
banc); People v. Dowery, 20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 312 N.E.2d 682 (1974), aff d, 62 Ill. 2d
200, 340 N.E.2d 529 (1975); Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 346 N.E.2d 746
(1976); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495 (Me. 1975); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190,
499 P.2d 49, aff'd en banc, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972). Although these
cases were decided in the context of illegal police searches of probationers and
parolees, in the absence of any holdings to the contrary and in light of the policy
stressed in many of these decisions, it can be inferred that these courts would
similarly deny application of the exclusionary rule in the context of unreasonable
probation/parole officer searches. When the decision not to extend the exclusionary
rule is based on a finding that revocation proceedings are not criminal trials, illegally
seized evidence is likely to be admitted regardless of who conducts the search. See
United States v. Farmer, 512 F.2d 160, 162 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987
(1975); United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163 (2d Cir.
1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 650, 652 (E.D.
La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880
(1971); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 579, 623 P.2d 8, 9 (1980) (en banc); People v.
Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 79, 525 P.2d 461, 462 (1974) (en banc); Dulin v. State, 169
Ind. App. 211, 217-21; 346 N.E.2d 746, 750-51 (1976); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495,
499 (Me. 1975); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App. 190, 193, 499 P.2d 49, 51, affd en
banc, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972). Similarly, many of these courts
indicate that the purposes of probation/parole can only be served by admitting any
reliable evidence into revocation proceedings, even if it is unconstitutionally ob-
tained. See United States ex rel. Sperling v. Fitzpatrick, 426 F.2d 1161, 1163-64 (2d
Cir. 1970); United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648, 651 (E.D.
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search by a police officer who has knowledge of a probationer's or
parolee's status, however, is analogous to a search by a probation or
parolee officer. Courts refusing to extend the exclusionary rule to
probation revocation proceedings under these circumstances,' 40 there-
fore, create the danger that a police officer with such knowledge will
conduct a substandard search141 and that incriminating evidence will
not be put to its maximum use for the protection of society. 142
La. 1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880
(1971); State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 580, 623 P.2d 8, 10 (1980) (en bane); People v.
Atencio, 186 Colo. 76, 79-80, 525 P.2d 461, 463 (1974) (en bane); People v. Dowery,
20 Ill. App. 3d 738, 7,l1-42, 312 N.E.2d 682, 685 (1974), afJ'd, 62 I11. 2d 200, 340
N.E.2d 529 (1975); Dulin v. State, 169 Ind. App. 211, 221, 346 N.E.2d 746, 753
(1976); State v. Caron, 334 A.2d 495, 499 (Me. 1975); State v. Kuhn, 7 Wash. App.
190, 195, 499 P.2d 49, 52, af'd en banc, 81 Wash. 2d 648, 503 P.2d 1061 (1972).
140. E.g., United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648 (E.D. La.
1970), aff'd per curiam, 438 F.2d 1027 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 880 (1971);
State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 623 P.2d 8 (1980) (en bane). In Lombardino, a
probationer was stopped on the street and frisked by the policeman who had arrested
him for the offense for which he was then serving probation. 318 F. Supp. at 650. In
conducting the search, the officer had neither reasonable grounds for suspicion that
Lombardino was armed, nor probable cause for arrest. Id. The search was unconsti-
tutional, and the marijuana discovered was suppressed in a subsequent criminal trial,
but admitted in Lombardino' s revocation hearing. The court held that "Lombardino
was afforded protection from the unlawful search . . . when the marijuana was
suppressed and the possession charge dropped." Id. at 650 (emphasis omitted). A
similar position was taken by the Arizona Supreme Court in State v. Alfaro. Three
years prior to Alfaro, the Arizona Court of Appeals, in State v. Shirley, 117 Ariz. 105,
570 P.2d 1278 (Ct. App. 1977), overruled, State v. Alfaro, 127 Ariz. 578, 623 P.2d 8
(1980) (en bane), held that the exclusionary rule was properly invoked to suppress
evidence in a probation revocation hearing in which the evidence had been obtained
from an illegal search conducted by a police officer who was aware of the defendant's
probation status. Id. at 107, 570 P.2d at 1280. In Alfaro, a probationer was the
subject of a search conducted by police officers who were aware of his probation
status. 127 Ariz. at 579, 623 P.2d at 9. Relying on Shirley, the defendant argued that
the search was illegal and that the evidence obtained should be excluded from his
revocation hearing. The state supreme court, expressly disapproving Shirley, held
that the exclusionary rule is not applicable to revocation proceedings regardless of the
prior knowledge possessed by the police. Id. at 580, 623 P.2d at 10.
141. United States v. Winsett, 518 F.2d 51, 54 (9th Cir. 1975). "[W]hen the police
at the moment of search know that a suspect is a probationer, they may have a
significant incentive to carry out an illegal search even though knowing that evidence
would be inadmissible in any criminal proceeding. The police have nothing to risk: If
the motion to suppress in the criminal proceedings were denied, defendant would
stand convicted of a new crime; and if the motion were granted, the defendant
would still find himself behind bars due to revocation of probation." Id. at 54 n.5.
See generally R. Dawson, supra note 17, at 145, 319, 342-43 (inclinafion of police to
investigate parolees and probationers). The substantial time and effort saved by
avoiding a new trial and seeking revocation may make revocation the preferred
alternative. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 479 (1972); R. Dawson, supra
note 17, at 363.
142. See supra notes 108, 132 and accompanying text.
REVOCATION OF PROBATION/PAROLE
The potential injury to the public from the loss of evidence is easily
illustrated.14 3  For example, a felony narcotics offender with two
years left on parole who commits a subsequent narcotics offense can
be incarcerated under federal law, as a multiple felon, for up to thirty
years.14 Admission in a revocation proceeding of evidence obtained
in an illegal search by a parole officer concerned only with revocation
could result in a maximum return to jail for two years, the term left on
his parole. 45  The evidence, however, would be inadmissible at
trial. 146 Requiring the officer to satisfy a single standard of admissi-
bility would result in the greater likelihood of a maximum incarcera-
tion of thirty-two years-the two years left on parole and the maxi-
mum, thirty-year new sentence. 47 The undeterred probation/parole
officer, therefore, presents a double danger: invasion of the privacy of
the probationer/parolee and diminution of society's ability to deal
effectively with the multiple criminal offender.
CONCLUSION
The warrant requirement coupled with a lesser standard of proba-
ble cause strikes a favorable balance between a probationer's or parol-
ee's legitimate expectation of privacy and the rehabilitative and crime
prevention goals of probation/parole. The probation/parole officer's
broad authority to make reasonable home visits and a flexible stan-
143. To comprehend the inadequacy of probationlparole revocation when con-
trasted against the possibility of successfully lodging new criminal charges in addition
to revocation, the consequences of revocation must be understood. If parole is re-
voked, the parolee can be incarcerated only for the number of years remaining on his
original sentence as of the day parole began. See 18 U.S.C. § 4214(d)(5) (1976); H.
Abadinsky, supra note 17, at 190; H. Burns, supra note 17, at 307; C. Newman,
supra note 20, at 73. If, upon granting probation, the court imposes a sentence and
suspends the execution, the court will be barred from imposing a greater sentence
upon revocation than was initially imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3653 (1976); Roberts v.
United States, 320 U.S. 264, 272-73 (1943); see United States v. Hill, 447 F.2d 817,
819 (7th Cir. 1971).
144. Under 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976), it is unlawful for an unauthorized
person "to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufac-
ture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Id. Any person performing any
of these proscribed acts with a schedule I or II narcotic drug, such as heroin, cocaine,
marijuana, and many widely used amphetamines, may be sentenced to a term of
imprisonment of up to 15 years. Id. § 841(b)(1)(A). A second conviction under §
841(b)(1), or under any other law of the United States relating to narcotic drugs,
marijuana, or depressant or stimulant substances, may lead to a term of imprison-
ment of up to 30 years. Id. Under § 846, attempts and conspiracies to commit the acts
proscribed by § 841 are punishable by the same penalties prescribed for commission
of the act itself. Id. § 846.
145. See supra note 143.
146. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
147. See supra note 108.
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dard of diminished probable cause give the officers the considerable
latitude necessary to exercise their supervisory responsibilities.
More importantly, the loss of evidence that results from a dual
standard of admissibility deprives society of needed protection. There-
fore, once a court determines that an illegal search has occurred, it
should extend the exclusionary rule to revocation proceedings. Such
application of the exclusionary rule would deter probation/parole
officers from conducting substandard searches. The goals of deterring
illegal searches and of protecting society from criminal activity, often
in conflict, are both optimally promoted by a single standard of
admissibility. *
Steven Monteforte
• After this Note went to press, the Second Circuit applied the exclusionary rule
in a probation revocation proceeding to evidence obtained in a warrantless search by
the defendant's probation officer. United States v. Rea. No. 81-1463 (2d Cir. May 3,
1982), vacating and remanding 524 F. Supp. 427 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
